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Abstract: The inflation targeting is considered as an attractive monetary policy strategy in order to handle 
the inflation rate and improves the credibility of the central bank. The paper provides a stochastic dynamic 
general equilibrium model with the specificity of employing a small open economy. This model analyzes the 
impact of different regimes of inflation targeting and exchange rate in Tunisia in terms of the welfare loss 
and describes some aspects of the Tunisian’s economy. The results displays that the social loss is higher 
under the managed exchange rate than the flexible exchange rate regime for all the shocks. Then in terms of 
the inflation targeting index, it demonstrates that the consumer prices index outperforms the domestic 
inflation except for the productivity shock, in contrast to the result of (Parrado, 2004). Finally   the strict is 
superior to the flexible inflation targeting except with the foreign inflation  and the domestic interest rate 
shock. 
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1. Introduction  
 
For a long time, the choice of an appropriate inflation targeting (IT) and between targeting managed or 
floating exchange rate has been a focus of many researches. This is explained by the liberalization of the 
international financial transactions and the huge increase of their volume that is followed. How would the 
features of the economy affect this choice? What are the different implications in terms of the 
macroeconomic performance or the welfare? Many empirical studies suggest that when pursuing the (IT), 
the developing countries should not neglect the exchange rate target to avoid the high exchange rate 
volatility and the impact on the firm’s profitability. A few theoretical and empirical studies that have treated 
this kind of regime for the small open economies. The problem is treated in this case for the lack of interest 
as confirmed by Parrado (2004). In addition according to Peiris & Saxegaard (2007) there is not lot of 
papers that have attacked the subject of the trade-offs between monetary policies rules in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) and the low-income countries. The model is different from many recent papers in many points. 
First it emphasized on a small open economy while most of the other studies concentrated on a world 
economy composed of two countries excepting Gali & Monacelli (2002). Second we note the difficulty of 
some central banks to support the exchange rate system, strengthen the anchor problem: the exchange rate 
or the inflation target Parrado (2004). Third, it has been shown that the trade   between the countries and 
the mobility of the capital markets as well as the remittance inflow encourage the researcher to find out 
how to adapt the monetary and the exchange rate policies to this new regime and to distinguish which kind 
of regime is more adaptable for the small open economy in terms of stability, especially in Tunisia. 
Remittances are considered as a foreign consumption shock that has impact on the domestic economy by 
incorporating a negative preference shock parameter in the foreign household utility function. This latter 
will invest or remit income in the domestic economy at the detriment of his own consumption. 
 
It is reported that the profit remittance on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Tunisia recognized an 
ascending trend since 1980. To stabilize the real economy and to show the interest of modeling the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), some authors focused on the tradeoffs between the 
monetary policy rules. For example Peiris & Saxegaard (2007)  studied the monetary policy trade-offs of the 
inflation  and the exchange rate targeting in the low income countries estimated on   the Mozambique  data 
using  (DSGE) model considering the sources of major exogenous shocks, and the  financial development. 
On the other hand Chow et al. (2012) employs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium-vector 
autoregressive (DSGE-VAR) approach to examine  if the managed exchange-rate system outperform 
monetary  Taylor in Singapore in terms of overall inﬂation volatility  depending on many shocks . Also 
Huseynov (2010) estimated a small open economy using DSGE model taking in consideration the regime 
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switches from exchange rate targeting to (IT) with flexible exchange rate . They also investigate the main 
driving forces of business cycles of the main macroeconomic variables. In this paper a common features 
with the Armenian economy are taken into consideration. First the importance of the remittance inflow as 
mentioned previously. Second considering the unit labor cost of the imported firms in their pricing decision 
that implies a low responsive of the imported good to the real exchange rate movements than in the 
standard models with nominal rigidities. The paper compares the economic volatility and the welfare in 
Tunisia of the managed versus flexible exchange rate, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) versus domestic (IT), 
the flexible versus the strict IT, the domestic versus the CPI Taylor rule regime.  
 
The optimal regime is the one that stabilizes the economy face to many shocks and minimize the output, the 
exchange rate and the inflation‘s volatility, leading to a lower social loss. Some authors like Svensson (2000) 
suggested the flexible CPI (IT), because it stabilizes the output, the inflation and the real exchange rate. This 
model differs from the one of Svensson (2000) as it depends on the analyze of the impacts of different 
exchange rate regimes; leading to policy advice depending on the source and nature of the disturbances.   
The best reaction in terms of welfare is considered with the different monetary policies rules. It is revealed 
that the social loss is higher with the managed exchange rate than the flexible exchange rate regime  for all 
the shocks, and that  the CPI inflation outperforms the domestic (IT).At the end,  the  strict targeting is 
superior to the flexible (IT)except   for the foreign inflation and the domestic interest rate. The paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. Section 3 illustrates the model’s behavior face 
to shocks and evaluates the effect of these shocks conditional on the different monetary policy regimes. 
Section 4 displays the policy simulations results; finally section 5 summarizes the results.  
 
2. The Model Environment 
 
The design of the model builds upon Palma &Portugal (2014) who referred to Gali & Monacelli (2005), 
Justiniano & Preston (2010)1. This part of the thesis will consider a small open economy like Tunisia with 
some specifications like the adjustment costs, the habit formation to capture the inertia in the consumption, 
and the indexation of the prices. The utility function of the foreign household  is given by: 
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 where β is the discount factor, ζt  is an  exogenous stochastic variable.  It designs the consumption or the  
investment preference parameter for the foreign household. It is also called remittance parameter .The 
utility  is modified by adding this parameter because the existence of a large tunisian diaspora who are 
interested to remit income to Tunisia. Nt denotes the  labor supply.  η is the inverse elasticity of labor 
supply. The CPI inflation is given by  πt=lnpt-lnpt-1. In this paper, the law of one price (LOP) is considered for 
the export sector however there is an incomplete pass-through in the import sector (LOP gap). The 
assumption of a complete international financial markets and a perfect capital mobility concerning the risk 
sharing justify the existence of a large Tunisian Diaspora. In this context the intertemporal optimality 
condition for the domestic household is equated to the one of foreign household. After some modifications 
at time t+1 the consumption equation is defined as follow:  
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(2) 
Where ct is the consumption, h ϵ (0, 1) represents the external habit formation for the household, qt is the 
real exchange rate, y*t is the foreign output, ς is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution.  By 
assuming the complete markets at the international level, the real uncovered interest parity condition is 
given by:  
 
                                                                             𝑞𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡
∗ − (𝜉𝑡 − 𝜉𝑡+1)                         (3)                                                                     
that depends on the current real interest rate differentials as well as the remittance inflows. Where 
𝑟𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1is the domestic CPI based real interest rate and 𝑟𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝜋𝑡+1
∗   is the foreign real interest 
rate.Turning to   firms, there is a continuum of monopolistically-competitive identical firms that produce a 
good with a technology represented by the   production function   𝑌𝑡 𝑗  .The latter depends on the  labor 
supply Nt and the total productivity 𝑧𝑡 = log⁡(𝑍𝑡) and  follows an AR(1) process where  0 ≤ 𝜌𝑧 ≤ 1 is a 
                                                          
1 For more detail see also  the paper “A New Keynesian Model of the Armenian Economy” of Ashot Mkrtchyan, Era Dabla-
Norris, and   Ara Stepanyan 
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persistence parameter of the productivity and  𝜉𝑡
𝑧  is an iid preference shock. Moving to  price setting part of 
the model, it is worth stating that  the monopolistic firms fix prices in a Calvo manner in the domestic good 
market.Only 1-θh of the domestic firms can optimally reset the prices  while θh  cannot in every time t. Each 
period,the optimizing  firms set the price level   𝑃 ht  . As it is suggested by Svensson (2000), the presence of 
the adjustment cost and the habit formation can lead to a partial price adjustment which includes the 
backward looking component in the equation of the domestic inflation or the home Philips IS curve. 
 𝜋𝑡
ℎ = 𝛽ℎ𝜋𝑡−1
ℎ +  1 − 𝛽ℎ 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
ℎ + 𝜆𝜋ℎ𝑚𝑐𝑡where  0 < 𝛽ℎ < 1 (4) 
In this case λπh is the coefficient on marginal cost in the IS curve, θh   represents the degree of rigidity when 
setting price, mct designs the deviation of the marginal cost from the steady state. Concerning the import 
good sector part of the model. The price setting behavior for the domestic importers follow the same calvo 
procedure   assuming that only 1-θm of importers who change their prices while θm cannot. The assumption 
in this case is that the unit labor cost in domestic economy plays an important task in setting the price of 
importers firms. Concerning the supply part of the model .The latter describes the inflation dynamics and 
the marginal cost.  The real marginal cost of the importer companies illustrates the mechanism of the 
incomplete pass-trough of the import price implying an important shifts in the nominal and the real 
exchange rates which affects in return the consumption, the employment and the price level. The imported 
goods inflation equation is added with the adjustment cost and the habit formation similarly to the case of 
home goods inflation equation as follow: 
    𝜋𝑡
𝑚 = 𝛽𝑚𝜋𝑡−1
𝑚 +  1 − 𝛽𝑚  𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
𝑚 + 𝜆𝜋𝑚𝜓𝑡
𝑚 ,  0< 𝛽𝑚 < 1    (5) 
 The overall inflation in the economy is obtained by log linearizing the definition of CPI: 
         𝜋𝑡 =  1 − 𝛼 𝜋
ℎ + 𝛼𝜋𝑚  (6) 
As far as  the equilibrium of the model is concerned , the good Market clearing condition for the domestic 
economy is expressed  as follow: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑑1𝑞𝑡 − 𝑑2𝜓𝑡 +  𝑘1 + 𝑘2 𝑐𝑡 + (1 − 𝑘1 − 𝑘2)𝑦𝑡
∗ (7) 
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Where k1   is the part of the domestic consumption to GDP ,k2 is the fraction of the imported good  for the  
domestic goods . 
 
When it comes to monetary policy,as the Tunsian economy is trying to follow the inflation  targeting 
procedure,a simple , well understood  rule of monetary policy is used rather than the optimal rule under 
commitment and  a discretionary rule.  After the reform of 1986, the behavior of the monetary policy has 
changed.  For example there is  a shift from the direct discretionary  instruments to the intervention in the 
monetary market via the interest rate Chockri & Frihka (2011).They noticed that Tunisia tend to a complete 
flexibility of the exchange rate as well as the (IT). In this context Leitemo (1999)   insisted that that there 
are advantages in choosing a specific interest rate rule instead of letting the monetary authority 
discretionarily decide on the (IT) policy. In this case a Taylor rule is adopted with the extension of nominal 
exchange rate. However ,there is  another specificity  added  which    embodies a forward looking 
dimension. The monetary rule  illustrates the responses of central bank that sets its policy rate to adjust for 
deviations  of the expected CPI inflation, exchange rate and output changes from the target levels. Chockri 
&Frihka (2011) elucidated that the inflation anticipation is crucial to the central bank because of the delay 
of the monetary policy transmission on this variable. That is why the central bank’s decision must  rely on 
the forecasted inflation and not on the past one. Rudebush & Svensson (1998) found that inflation forecasts 
are central for good policy rules under (IT). They discovered that some simple instrument and targeting 
rules including inflation forecasts minimize better the loss function than the other policy rules representing 
the (IT).In this context, Ben Hadj Boubaker (2011) clarified  that when the imperfect control of inflation is a 
hindrance to inflation targeter to be transparent,the central bank should adopt a forward –looking 
perspective by targeting the inflation forecast as follow: 
                              it=ρi it-1 +(1-ρi)(ρ π πt+1 + ρ y  y+ ρ s  ds) +ϵ                                 (8) 
 
where ϵ is the exogenous process of the domestic interest rate .It captures deliberate decisions to deviate 
temporarily from its systematic rule, ρi is the smoothness of the interest rate by the central bank, ρ π is the 
coefficient that indicates the reaction of the interest rate to the overall inflation good, ρy is the response of 
the central bank to the change in the output, ρs the response of central bank to a change in the nominal 
exchange rate , ds is the movement of the nominal exchange rate. The exogenous process is defined as 
follow. The domestic productivity take this form zt = ρz*z t-1+εtz where εtz   (epsz) is the domestic 
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productivity shock. The world output is expressed as yt*= ρy* yt-1+ εty*   where εty* (epsystar) is the foreign output 
shock. The foreign interest rate is it*= ρi* i* t-1 +εt i*     where εt i* or (epsistar) is the foreign interest shock. The 
foreign inflation takes this form: πt*=ρ*π   π*t-1 + εtπ*,   where εtπ* (epspistar) is the foreign inflation shock. The 
domestic interest rate is defined as follow : ϵ =ρ ϵ * ϵt-1+εtϵ,  where εtϵ  (epsei) is the domestic interest rate 
shock .Finally the remittance or the preference of the foreign household  is defined as : ζt=  ρζ ζ t-1  +εζt   where 
εζt  (epszeta) is  the remittance shock . These shocks are independent and identically distributed (iid) with 
zero mean and standard deviation. 
 
3. The welfare criterion 
 
To explain  the welfare criterion , this study refer to the one of Parrado (2004) and  Svensson (2000).In fact 
Rudebusch & Svensson(1998) précised that by a targeting rule(one or several variables),  the central bank 
must minimize a loss function that is increasing in the deviation between a target variable and the target 
level for this variable. According to Svensson, the best way to minimize a loss function is to respond 
optimally with the instrument to the determinants of the state variables of the economy. It is crucial to 
analyze the welfare of different regime of the monetary policies2  to evaluate the expected social loss .In this 
case, the social loss depends on the output, the inflation and the real exchange rate‘s deviation from their 
steady state.  The assumption on the social loss is defined as an approximation of some aggregate of the 
welfare of the consumer-producers. It is obtained from the utility function of the representative agent. The 
welfare criterion of the home country is presented as: 
 Lt=Ψπh πh,t2  +μπc   𝜋ct  2+λ yt2  + μq   qt2 (9) 
After introducing the unconditional expectation, the loss function becomes: 
 E(Lt)= Ψπh var(πh,t )+ μπc var(πct) + λ var(yt)+ μq   var(qt  )  
Here  var(πh,t), var(qt) , var(yt) are the unconditional variances of the domestic inflation, the real exchange 
rate and the output gap  .   In this paper the following weights considered for the loss function are Ψπh=1.5 ,λ 
=0.5, μq  =0.5 , μπc =1.5, like those determined by Parrado(2004) in a small open economy like Chile..In 
general, the conclusion is approximate to the alternative reasonable parameter value. 
 
The Model simulation: The quantitative simulation is analyzed  to know how the (IT) and the taylor rule 
affect the business cycle dynamics with the DSGE model and  compare their influence on the output, the 
inflation, and the exchange rates.  In fact, the model considers six types of regimes. First the Strict vs the 
flexible domestic (IT) with both the flexible and the managed exchange rate ; the Strict  vs the flexible CPI 
(IT) with both the flexible and the managed exchange rate; the taylor rule with both the CPI and the 
domestic inflation.  
 
Calibration and parameterization: When it comes to the model parameterization, the parameter’s value 
exhibited in the table 1, are collected from the traditional related literature and  the current Tunisian data 
like the one of Jouini & Rebei (2014) and Ben aissa & Rebei (2012) .The data are annually  selected from 
1980Q1 to 2011Q4. The considered  variables are   the overall or the CPI inflation(pi )𝜋𝑡  defined in equation 
(6), the real exchange rate(q)  detected in equation (3), the output(y) noticed in (7), the home good inflation 
𝜋𝑡
ℎ  (𝑝𝑖ℎ)  showed in (4), the nominal interest rate(i) observed in (8),  the domestic real interest rate(rr) 
presented in (3). In this case the coefficients ρ πh , ρy ,ρs  and ρi  are not estimated with the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) such as Parrado (2004). However, these values are determined from the 
litterature of the  emergent countries like Armanian economy, Chile ,Turkey ,Brazil and the Tunisian data so 
as to obtain a performant result that is approximative to the Tunisian economy and to have an idea about 
the optimal regime in term of the welfare loss .The response of the central bank to the domestic inflation is 
given by ρ πh   =1.5 . When ρ πh   >1.5 ,this indicates that if the expected inflation rises ,the central bank of 
Tunisia reacts by increasing the interest rate remarkably.While the weight associated to the  output is not 
very significant ,it amounts to ρy = 0.25. The response of the central bank to the CPI inflation is fixed to  ρ π  
=1.5 . The  persistence parameter or the degree of smoothing of the  domestic productivity is calibrated as  
ρz = 0.80,while the one of the foreign output corresponds to   ρy* = 0.5. For the  foreign interest rate,it is  
equal to ρi* = 0.85.  
 
 
                                                          
2
  see the User manual for optimal policy package  of Michel Juillard 2011 
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Table 1: Model parameter value 
Parameter value Parameter Value 
k1 0.63 ρz 0.80 
k 2 0.17 ρy* 0.5 
k3 0.16 ρy 0.25 
Β 0.985 ρi* 0.85 
βh 0.65 ρπ* 0.5 
β m 0.45 ρζ 0.8 
βq 0.25 ρi 0.5 
Σ 1 η 1.45 
H 0.5 a 1.25 
θm 0.75 α ψ 0,60 
θh 0.67 α 0.68 
  a* 1.25 
 
On the other side, the foreign inflation persistent parameter is detected as   ρπ* = 0.5. The similar value 
holds  for the domestic interest rate ρi= 0.5. Then comes the  foreign preference  which is  designated to ρζ= 
0.8 . Finally the nominal exchange rate is picked as ρs   =0.85 . So it  is concluded    that the tunisian central 
bank is interested in stabilizing the inflation through the inflation target and the nominal exchange rate, 
without paying attention to the output stabilization where ρy = 0.25 .The quarterly discount factor is   
β=0.985. The simulation compares rules with ρy=0  which corresponds to  the strict (IT) against ρy=0.25 
which  explains  the flexible (IT)and ρ s=0 against ρs=0.85 which illustrates the flexible against the managed 
exchange rate regime.  Turning to the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption ς 
between the consumption of today and tomorrow, it is set to 13.On the other hand, the steady parameters 
are parametrized as follow: The ratio of government expenditure to GDP is given by k3=0,16 ;The ratio of 
the exports to GDP amounts to 0. 3.The imported good distribution share in the total demand is calculated 
as  k2 =0.17.The coefficient of the share of nominal marginal costs in total costs of the importing firms is set 
to  α ψ=0,60.The ratio of the private expenditure  to GDP or the share of domestic consumption to GDP is 
calibrated to k1=0,63.The share of the imported goods in the consumption(α) or the degree of openness is 
fixed to 0,68. When taking into account the stochastic process, it is noted that the standard deviation of the 
domestic productivity, the foreign output, the  foreign interest rate, the preference, the  foreign inflation 
and the domestic interest rate are chosen  as follow: ςz=0,01, ςy*=0,01 ςi*=0,01  ςζ=0,024    ςπ* =0,01  
ςϵ=0,005.  
 
4. Results  
 
In this study ,six types of shocks are considered :  the productivity, the world output, the foreign inflation, 
the preference, the foreign interest rate and the domestic interest rate. Each shock is a first order  
exogenous process. To obtain a policy evaluation criterion, it is crucial to consider the unconditional 
standard deviation of the variables  to each shock. The standard deviation is  illustrated in  the table 3 until 
8. The impulse response function of the principal variables to the different shocks are considered  for 
different types of inflation and exchange rate targeting regimes. 
 
Flexible versus managed exchange rate: Figureures 1 until 6 report  the impulse response function of the 
domestic(IT)  in the case of flexible vs managed exchange rate while the figureures 7 to 12 replicate the 
impulse response function of the CPI (IT) in the same case . In this case the blue line defines  the flexible 
Exchange rate  while the black line designs the managed exchange rate. Under the managed exchange rate  
regime, the monetary authority focus on stabilizing the exchange rate that is (ρs∈ (0,∞). In  most of the 
cases, the domestic interest rate (i) increases partially under this regime.  
 
 
                                                          
3(Smets  and Wouters, 2003)  estimate an intertemporal elasticity of substitution  equal to 0.7 for the Euro zone.(Bergin, 2006) 
estimate a value of  nearly 1 for the United states. (Adjémian  et  al. 2004) obtained a values near to one for the United States 
as well as for the  Euro zone. (Juillard  et  al. 2006) find a value of 0.8 for the United States .A  unit value is current in the 
literature (Ireland, 2004). 
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Regime I : Flexible vs managed exchange rate: Domestic inflation targeting 
 
Figure 1: orthogonalized shock to      εty* 
 
Figure 2: orthogonalized shock to   εζt 
 
Figure 3:  orthogonalized shock to ε i*                                          
 
Figure 4: orthogonalized shock to ε π*       
 
Figure 1 : orthogonalized shock to εtz   
 
Figure 2: orthogonalized shock to εtϵ 
 
Regime II: Flexible vs managed exchange rate : CPI inflation targeting 
Figure 7: orthogonalized shock to     εty*    Figure 8: orthogonalized shock to    εζt        
 
Figure 9: orthogonalized shock to ε i*                                           
 
Figure 10:    orthogonalized shock to ε π*       
 
 Figure 11: orthogonalized shock to  εtz     Figure 12: orthogonalized shock to 
εtϵ 
 
The nominal rigidities   which  is the origin of the ascension in the  real interest rate (rr) , causes a 
depreciation of the output(y). According to Parrado (2004) this result is consistent with the conventional 
wisdom.While under the flexible exchange rate, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate to the 
change of the output and the inflation only that is ρs =0. However under the flexible or the managed 
exchange rate regime , the domestic interest rate( i )is linked to the foreign interest rate shock(ε i*),or any 
other foreign disturbance. That is, when there is a foreign interest rate shock(ε i*), there is a depreciation of 
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the nominal interest rate(i)  with all the foreign shocks. This is consistent with the result of 
Parrado(2004)except with  the foreign inflation shock(ε π*).  Moreover ,for both the managed and the 
flexible exchange rate regime and with the foreign interest shock  (ε i*), the CPI inflation(π=pi) is 
depreciated.  The table 3 to 8 report that for  the majority of the shocks, the unconditional standard 
deviation of the output (yt),the CPI inflation volatility(π)  and the domestic inflation (π h=pih)are higher in 
the managed than the flexible exchange rate regime. As Peiris &Saxegaard (2007), it is noticed  that the 
exchange rate peg has a significant impact on the CPI inflation volatility (π).  Nevertheless, this is not the 
case of the nominal exchange rate (qt) which shows a small volatility in the managed exchange rate regime 
compared to the flexible one with nearly  all the shocks. 
 
Table2: The welfare losses 
 
Table 3: Unconditional standard deviation of the  productivity shock (epsz= εtz) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding is in line with  the result of Gali & Monacelli (2005).  Turning to the table 2 , the latter 
illustrates the welfare loss of a different monetary policies associated with many  shocks.It is concluded 
from  this table that  the flexible  dominates the  managed exchange rate   for both the CPI and the domestic 
(IT) regime because the welfare loss of the managed exchange rate is higher with almost all the shocks.  
(Parrado, 2004) confirmed the conventional wisdom that the flexibility is better in the case of foreign and 
real exchange rate shocks, while pegging is preferable in the case of nominal shocks. To confirm our result, 
it is worth stating the finding of Gali &Monacelli( 2005) concerning the welfare loss of the exchange rate 
peg  which  is higher than the taylor rule . 
                          
 
 
Domestic 
interest 
rate εtϵ 
Productiv
ity εtz 
World 
output 
εty* 
Foreign 
inflation 
ε π* 
Preference 
εζt 
Foreign 
interest rate 
ε i* 
Strict domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.000  0.006 
Managed exchange rate 0.002 0.989 0.006 0.058 0.563 0.746 
Flexible domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.001 1.729 0.003 0.003 0.052 0.078 
Managed exchange rate 0.002 2.677 0.015 0.066 0.635 0.844 
Strict CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.032 0.000   0.000 
Managed exchange rate 0.001 0.705 0.003 0.038 0.468 0.637 
Flexible CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.001 1.716 0.006 0.003 0.063 0.092 
Managed exchange rate 0.002 2.465 0.014 0.053 0.576 0.786 
Tayor rule domestic inflation       
it=1.5πth+0.25yt -0.000 1.730 0.003 0.003 0.052 0.077 
Taylor rule CPI inflation       
it=1.5πt+0.25yt 0.000 1.709 0.004 0.0039 0.064 0.092 
Targeting case / variables  πct    qt yt πht     it rrt 
Strict domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.132   1.812      1.892     0.049      0.964      1.045      
Managed exchange rate 0.179      1.212      1.852      0.427      0.443      0.362      
Flexible domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.124     1.599      1.850      0.115      0.696      0.703      
Managed exchange rate 0.215      1.233     1.834      0.405      0.489 0.319      
Strict CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.000      1.490      1.855      0.216      0.611      0.611      
Managed exchange rate 0.286      1.079     1.900      0.630      0.260      0.253      
Flexible CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.085      1.348      1.846      0.312      0.490      0.423      
Managed exchange rate 0.276      1.120      1.856     0.532      0.418      0.265 
Taylor rule domestic inflation       
it=1.5Πth+0.5yt 0.122     1.570      1.846      0.129      0.649     0.647     
Taylor rule  CPI inflation       
it=1.5Πt+0.5yt 0.078      1.398   1.844      0.275      0.564      0.501      
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Domestic vs CPI inflation targeting: According to Svensson (2000),the difference between the CPI and the 
domestic inflation can be detected when the direct exchange rate channel is more  noticeable in the CPI 
targeting. Figureures 13 to 24 exhibit the impulse response functions comparing the CPI vs the 
domestic(IT) with respectively the flexible and the managed exchange rate. In this case the blue line 
illustrates the CPI  (IT) while the  black line designs the domestic(IT). It is worth noticing that in the case of 
the managed exchange rate, it is not appropriate to compare between the CPI and the domestic (IT) since  
the difference of  the variable volatilities is negligible Parrado(2004). In contrast to  the flexible exchange 
regime which  is a suitable regime  for comparison . In fact with this regime, targeting the CPI is equivalent 
to targeting both domestic inflation and nominal exchange rate. Parrado (2004) highlighted that the 
domestic inflation target favorizes the movement of the exchange rate in response to shocks to stablize the 
output.   
 
Table 4: Unconditional standard deviation for world output shock (epsystar= εty*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it is remarqued in the tables 3 to 8 that for most of the shocks,the volatility of most of the variables 
under the flexible exchange rate regime is higher in the CPI than the domestic (IT) especially for the 
domestic inflation(πh) and the output(y). In contrast to  the volatility of the real exchange rate variable(qt) 
which is rather higher with the domestic inflation targeting regime.This result is conform to the one of 
Parrado (2004). In addition it is discovered  from the table 2  that the welfare is preferable in the CPI than 
under the domestic (IT)because the social loss is higher in the domestic(IT). This preference for the CPI is 
justified by the use  of 27 inflation targeters of the  (CPI). As their operational target, they especially use the 
headline rather than the core measure because it is largely for practical and operational reasons Hammond 
(2012). Independently of the nature of the shock or the targeting case ,the result  found is in  contradiction  
with the  study of  Parrado (2004). On the other hand, Ben aissa &Rebei (2012) found that the welfare gains 
in targeting sectoral rather than CPI inﬂation.  
 
Flexible versus strict inflation targeting: According to Ball (1997) the strict inflation is manifested when 
the policy minimizes the variance of inflation from its target. The latter occurs when the monetary policy 
aims to stabilize only the inflation and the exchange rate without taking into consideration the effects on 
the output(ρy=0) Svensson( 2000).In this case, the direct exchange rate channel offers a potentially effective 
inﬂation  stabilization  at  a  relatively  short  horizon Svensson (1997).  According to Svensson (2000) this 
may require activism and frequent adjustment of the monetary policy instrument with the variability of the 
macro variables other than the inflation. However, the flexible inflation targeting is achieved  when the 
central bank aims to stabilize the output, the exchange rate  and the inflation . In this case there are a less 
activism and a less variability in the macro variables except for the inflation. For more detail of the reaction 
of the macro variable face to the different shock’s  movement under the flexible exchange rate,figureures 25 
to 36 compare the impulse response functions of the  flexible vs  strict domestic and CPI(IT). In the figures 
25  to 30 the Blue line indicates the  flexible CPI inflation targeting while the  Black line  determines the 
strict CPI inflation targeting .  
 
 
 
Targeting case /variables πct qt yt πht it rrt 
Strict domestic  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.013 0.127 0.113 0.031 0.063 0.070 
Managed exchange rate 0.017 0.090 0.140 0.047 0.039 0.037 
Flexible domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.026 0.094 0.094 0.033 0.090 0.104 
Managed exchange rate 0.013 0.116 0.121 0.035 0.054 0.059 
Strict CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.017 0.096 0.135 0.046 0.039 0.041 
Managed exchange rate 0.030 0.066 0.162 0.066 0.025 0.023 
Flexible CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.025 0.147 0.100 0.035 0.076 0.090 
Managed exchange rate 0.014 0.102 0.131 0.040 0.045 0.047 
Taylor rule domestic inflation       
it=1.5Πth+0.5yt 0.019 0.188 0.078 0.019 0.138 0.152 
Taylor rule  CPI inflation       
it=1.5Πt+0.5yt 0.021 0.172 0.085 0.025 0.124 0.134 
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Table5: Unconditional standard deviation for foreign inflation shock(epspistar= εtπ*) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Unconditional standard deviation for preference shock (epszeta= εζt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless in the figurers 31 to 36, the  blue line designs the flexible domestic (IT)while the   black line 
displays  the strict domestic(IT). The first observation  that is  elucidated is, regardless  the type of regime  
and the shock, the majority of the volatility’s variables  are higher in the strict than  the flexible case. For the 
majority of the shocks, there is  a higher volatility of the output (yt)and the domestic inflation (πh)  
especially with the strict (IT)regime  for both the CPI or the domestic inflation . This result is in line with the 
one of Parrado( 2004). In contrast to the real exchange rate (qt), whose volatility is higher with the flexible  
(IT) in most of the cases. This finding   matches  the one of (Parrado, 2004)but differ to the one of Svenson 
(2000) who revealed that with the strict CPI(IT), the volatility of the exchange rate(qt) is important while  
in the flexible case, it recognizes  a considerable stabilization . In fact, Svensson (2000) pointed out that the 
strict CPI (IT)  is based on the direct  exchange rate channel to stabilize the CPI inflation (π) at a short 
horizon implying a high variability of the real exchange rate and the other variables. In this context Ball 
(1999) highlighted that in an open economy, the (IT) can be dangerous because of the effects of exchange 
rates on inflation through the  import prices. This exchange rate is considered as the fastest channel from 
the monetary policy to the inflation. In this case, the (IT)is used aggressively.The large variation in the 
exchange rate implies a large output fluctuation through the IS curve. 
        
There are some variables whose  result is ambiguous like  the CPI inflation (π), the domestic interest rate( i) 
and the domestic CPI based real interest rate (rr) .In terms of the welfare comparison,the Table 2 reports 
that the social loss is higher with the flexible than with the strict IT for the majority of the variables and the 
Targeting case/variables πct qt yt πht it rrt 
Strict domestic  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.036 0.444 0.095 0.023 0.348 0.329 
Managed exchange rate 0.034 0.293 0.137 0.104 0.510 0.536 
Flexible domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.028 0.419 0.086 0.021 0.379 0.363 
Managed exchange rate 0.032 0.309 0.116 0.087 0.488 0.512 
Strict CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.005 0.354 0.096 0.060 0.437 0.439 
Managed exchange rate 0.075 0.246 0.189 0.160 0.527 0.587 
Flexible CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.013 0.379 0.084 0.040 0.413 0.410 
Managed exchange rate 0.059 0.274 0.143 0.122 0.497 0.543 
Taylor rule domestic inflation       
it=1.5Πth+0.5yt 0.038 0.414 0.078 0.014 0.392 0.381 
Taylor rule  CPI inflation       
it=1.5Πt+0.5yt 0.017 0.382 0.083 0.0418 0.394 0.397 
Targeting case /variables πct    qt yt πht it rrt 
Strict domestic  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.114      1.182      0.339      0.070      0.088      0.093     
Managed exchange rate 0.081      1.003      0.394      0.205     0.312      0.346      
Flexible domestic  IT        
Flexible exchange rate 0.108      1.175      0.339      0.069      0.086      0.093      
Managed exchange rate 0.081      1.027      0.368      0.171    0.268      0.285      
Strict CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.015      1.040      0.3758      0.173      0.204      0.205     
Managed exchange rate 0.156      0.929      0.5126      0.371      0.303      0.424      
Flexible CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.049      1.092      0.3470      0.115      0.132     0.117      
Managed exchange rate 0.109      0.964      0.4318      0.278    0.242      0.320    
Taylor rule domestic inflation               
it=1.5Πth+0.5yt 0.126      1.152      0.3232      0.009      0.165     0.097      
Taylor rule  CPI inflation       
it=1.5Πt+0.5yt 0.049      1.095     0.3499      0.125      0.112      0.104      
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shocks except the foreign inflation ε π* and the domestic interest rate εtϵ shock. This finding is in contrast to 
the result detected by Parrado (2004) and Svensson (2000)when targeting inflation at a longer horizon. 
 
Table7: Unconditional standard deviation for foreign interest rate shock(epsistar= εt i* ) 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taylor rule CPI vs Taylor rule domestic inflation targeting: The domestic and the CPI inflation can be 
compared in terms of the taylor rule .This is another characteristic added in this study besides the other 
regimes . With  this rule, the  interest rate is  adjusted in response to the output and the inflation. The rule 
was  supported by the theoretical models of Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997).In their models, the optimal 
policies are a version of the inflation targets and the Taylor rules. It is observed from the table 8 that with 
the domestic interest rate shock εtϵ, all the endogenous variables  are constant or non stationary, not 
displaying correlations and auto-correlations. Unlike  the CPI (IT), it is discovered as Svensson (2000) that 
the taylor rule excludes any direct important response to foreign shocks of the variables.. The volatility of 
the real exchange rate(qt) with all the shocks is higher in the domestic than the CPI inflation instrument 
.Contrary to  the domestic inflation (πh)and the output(y) which are higher in the CPI inflation , nearly with 
all the shocks. The domestic interest rate (i )is higher with the domestic inflation expect with the foreign 
inflation shock. The Figurer 37 to 41 illustrate the impulse response function of these variables  face to 
different shocks in the case of taylor rule. In this context the blue line designs  the domestic taylor rule 
while the  black line displays the   CPI taylor rule. Finally, the welfare loss in the  Table 2   exhibits that the 
CPI inflation taylor rule is slightly higher than  the domestic inflation taylor rule, with almost  all the shocks 
except the productivity. This finding differs from the one revealed by Gali &Monacelli (2005) whose welfare 
loss is higher with the domestic inflation compared to the CPI instrument taylor rule. 
 
Table8: Unconditional standard deviation for domestic interest rate shock(epsei= εtϵ) 
Targeting case /variables πct    qt yt πht it rrt 
Strict domestic  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.122      1.310      0.408      0.083      1.703      1.641      
Managed exchange rate 0.186      1.085      0.564      0.386      1.772      1.931      
Flexible domestic IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.151      1.293      0.391      0.023      1.750      1.696     
Managed exchange rate 0.253      1.091     0.503      0.367     1.664      1.894     
Strict CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.020      1.194      0.446      0.189      1.746      1.746      
Managed exchange rate 0.161      1.093      0.574      0.382      1.816      1.936    
Flexible CPI  IT       
Flexible exchange rate 0.053      1.237      0.420      0.126      1.712      1.700      
Managed exchange rate 0.129      1.121      0.515      0.295      1.808      1.921      
Taylor rule domestic inflation       
it=1.5Πth+0.5yt 0.145      1.295      0.392      0.016      1.726      1.678      
Taylor rule  CPI inflation       
it=1.5Πt+0.5yt 0.054      1.234      0.419      0.126      1.709      1.704      
Targeting case/ variables πct    qt yt πht it rrt 
Strict domestic inflation targeting       
Flexible exchange rate 0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Managed exchange rate 0.0002      0.0002      0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Flexible domestic inflation targeting       
Flexible exchange rate 0.0002      0.0002      0.0002      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Managed exchange rate 0.0002      0.0002      0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Strict CPI inflation targeting       
Flexible exchange rate 0.0002      0.0003      0.0003      0.0003      0.0001      0.0002      
Managed exchange rate 0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Flexible CPI inflation targeting       
Flexible exchange rate 0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Managed exchange rate 0.0002      0.0002      0.0002      0.0002      0.0001      0.0001      
Taylor rule domestic inflation       
it=1.5Πth+0.5yt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor rule  CPI inflation       
it=1.5Πt+0.5yt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Although the (IT) is not yet applied in Tunisia. The specificity of this study  is comparing different monetary 
policies  and exchange rate regimes in terms of volatility and   welfare   to choose the optimal case in a small 
open economy like Tunisia . In this paper a DSGE model is employed  in  Tunisian economy with some 
features to capture the  persistence and the covariance in the data like the habit formation and the  
investment adjustment cost. The most striking result, is that the social loss is higher with the managed 
exchange rate than  the flexible exchange rate regime for almost all the shocks.  Also regarding  the( 
IT)index, it is revealed  that in contrast  to Parrado (2004), the CPI  outperforms the domestic inflation. 
Finally, it is discovered that the strict is superior to the flexible (IT) with the major of the shocks. A future 
research  can be worthwhile   in comparing targeting the headline or the core CPI inflation or   targeting 
sectoral inflation i.e., subsidized or non subsidized good vs the CPI inflation like the study of  Ben Aissa & 
Rebai (2012). The model’s parameters are conform to the Tunisian economy. Our contribution can be seen 
in capturing some features in the model like for example the nominal rigidity in the imported sector in the 
Tunisian economy . This is because the imported goods sector uses labor forces. Also the remittance  is 
added  in the model because their significant impact on the real exchange rate through the uncovered 
interest parity condition ,as well as their effect on the output.  Also comparing these different regimes in 
terms of t welfare and adding the forward component in the monetary  rule  can enrich this study. 
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Annex 1 
 
Regime III: CPI vs domestic inflation Targeting: Flexible exchange rate 
 
 
  Fig. 13: orthogonalized shock to  εty*    
 
  Fig. 14: orthogonalized shock to   εtϵ 
 
Fig. 15: orthogonalized shock to εζt 
 
   Fig. 16: orthogonalized shock to ε i*                                             
 
 Fig. 17: orthogonalized shock to ε π*       
 
  Fig. 18: orthogonalized shock to εtz    
     
       
      Regime IV: CPI vs domestic IT: Managed exchange rate. 
 
Fig. 19: orthogonalized shock to εty*        
 
  Fig. 20: orthogonalized shock to εtϵ      
 
   Fig. 21: orthogonalized shock to εζt          
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Fig. 22: orthogonalized shock to ε i*                                                      Fig. 23: orthogonalized shock to ε π*       
 
Fig. 24: orthogonaized shock to εtz 
 
Regime V:Flexible vs strict CPI inflation targeting: Flexible exchange rate. 
 
Fig. 25: orthogonalized shock to εty*     
 
Fig. 26: orthogonalized shock to εtz 
 
Fig. 27: orthogonalized shock to ε π*                                                
 
Fig. 28: orthogonalized shock to ε i*                                                       
 
Fig. 29: orthogonalized shock to εζt    
 
Fig. 30: orthogonalized shock to εtϵ  
 
 Regime VI: Flexible vs strict domestic inflation targeting: Flexible exchange rate  
Fig. 31: orthogonalized shock to εty 
 
Fig. 32: orthogonalized shock to εtz  
 
Fig. 33: orthogonalized shock to εζt                                  
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Fig. 34: orthogonalized shock toε π*       
 
Fig. 3 : orthogonalized shock to εtϵ 
 
Fig. 4 : orthogonalized shock to ε i*                                                       
 
  Regime VII: Taylor rule domestic vs CPI inflation  
 
Fig. 35: orthogonalized shock to εtz     
 
Fig. 38: orthogonalized shock to ε π*          
 
Fig. 39: orthogonalized shock to εζt 
 
Fig. 40: orhtogonalized shock to ε i*                                                            
 
Fig. 41: orthogonalized shock to εty*       
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